Comments on Proposed Revisions to Article 2 of
CFP Board's Disciplinary Rules and Procedures

On January 2, 2009, the Board of Directors (Board) of Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc. (CFP Board) announced a request for comments on proposed revisions to Article 2 of its Disciplinary Rules and Procedures (Disciplinary Rules). At its March 2009 meeting, the Board adopted revisions that align the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures with changes the Board made in February 2008 regarding oversight of the Commission and to establish stated policies for certain activities related to the Commission that are not specifically addressed in the previous Disciplinary Rules and Procedures.

The revisions were adopted following the Board’s review and consideration of comments received during a public comment period. The text of the comments received are available for review below. A summary of the comments, and a chart displaying the text of the previous and revised Article 2 are available at www.CFP.net/aboutus/Rules_Proposal.asp.

Note: The views, expressions, findings and opinions expressed in the comments on this Web page are solely those of the author(s), and CFP Board accepts no responsibility for the content of the comments. Comments received via e-mail have been provided in full below.

Comments

Updated February 11, 2009


MICHAEL W. BALDERSON

Date: January 5, 2009

The CEO seems to have taken on a larger role of authority. Are there sufficient checks and balances to their decisions? What are those checks and how easily can they be administered?

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LOUIS J. BALOGH

Date: January 3, 2009

Why is the investigation procedure taken away from the commission? Other than that the new does a better job of setting out the details.

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MARK BARRETT

Date: January 5, 2009

After reviewing the proposed revisions I want to voice concerns over several of the proposed revisions.

2.3 It appears the CEO will be able to "stack" the commission since the CEO controls all aspect of the appointment of members. I prefer the old structure.

2.4 I prefer the old structure which consists of 2 CFP certificants and one board member. This keeps the focus and majority of the hearing panel on non-staff practitioners.

2.7 Strongly object - Venue should be local to the Certificant, or at least in the same State. Having the venue in Washington DC is unduly expensive for a practitioner to adequately defend or find counsel.

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DAVID BERNARD

Date: January 4, 2009

My only comment is one that I’m sure you folks are completely in tune with. Namely, compliance with ethics does not mean that the clients’ assets are always appreciating. In my 36 years of practice I suspect that complaints which I’ve heard about from others, which are somehow made in the name of “ethics”, instead have their root cause in client dissatisfaction with market performance. Clients need to remember that planners’ assets have suffered the same results as client assets. Likewise planners’ fee income has suffered the same result, when that income is based on assets under management!

As simple as that sounds, the discussion of ethics can very subtly have components of account performance dissatisfaction. I urge your wisdom in watching for this issue and carefully separating performance from ethics.

I don’t envy your very difficult job of writing and administering the rules and procedures. I do thank you all for doing so, for the many hours of volunteer labor of dedication and care which you provide to our association.

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SHEL BRANDENBURGER, CFP®

Date: January 2, 2009

Your "Current Text" is shown below in non-capitalized and non-bolded internal letters. As set forth using the grid-format in your second attachment, YOUR PROPOSED TEXT and my responses are shown below with all letters capitalized and bold: Article 2.1: Because "Investigating" has been dropped, WHO WILL BE DOING SUCH VITAL STEP, HENCEFORTH (i.e. NOT SPECIFIED)?

Article 2.2: "(a)" and "(c)" - - REVERSE THE LISTING ORDER OF THESE SUB-PARAGRAPHS FOR CLARIFICATION;

"(c)" - - What are the differences in meaning between the "Commission," "prospective Commission members," "prospective volunteers" and "Hearing Panel?" THE WORDING OF THIS SUB-PARAGRAPH IS NOT NEARLY CLEAR ENOUGH !

"(f)" - - THE REFERENCE TO "PROCESS" IS AMBIGUOUS and NOT DEFINED ! IS IT CLEARLY DESCRIBED SOMEWHERE ELSE ? WHERE?

Article 2.3: "(d)" - - SUDDENLY THERE IS REFERENCE TO THE "COMMISSION ON PROSPECTIVE COMMISSION MEMBERS." AREN'T THERE ALREADY TOO MANY USES OF THE WORD "COMMISSION" ? WOULDN'T COMMITTEE, OR TASK FORCE, OR SPECIAL DELEGATION (OR SOME OTHER DESCRIPTION) BE PREFERABLE, AS ANTECEDENTS, TO THE DESIGNATION "ON PROSPECTIVE COMMISSION MEMBERS ?"

"(e)" . . . . THE COMMISSION." WHICH COMMISSION ???

ARTICLE 2.4: . . . . . the phrase "must be a voting member of the Commission" has been deleted. Why ?

Article 2.5: There appears to be no change; why isn't that so stipulated in the Proposed Text ?

Article 2.6: "(a)" - - With reference to the phrase "THE ATTORNEY WHO PRESENTS THE CASE TO THE HEARING PANEL," surely there is no new requirement that only the CFP Counsel may present a case to the hearing panel (?) AM I CORRECT ?

"(b)" - - What is "the RATIFICATION MEETING?"

FINALLY, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO PROVISION IN THIS PROPOSED TEXT FOR APPEALING A FINAL, ADVERSE DECISION IN AN ETHICS CASE TO THE FULL CFP BOARD ? NO POSSIBILITY FOR AN APPEAL ? "DUE PROCESS," come on . . . . . .

And finally, because the Chief Executive Officer is to be given such greatly expanded power and authority in this ethics arena, what checks and balances are to be put into place to protect individual members/certificants from arbitrary decision-making, from being unfairly lobbied or influenced, and/or from abuse of authority; other than our just "trusting" the Board to be his/her overseer ?

An impartial monitoring arrangement (possibly made up of non-Board CFP members) of the CEO's performance would seem to be essential ! The role of the CEO in this arena is too critical to have oversight only by the Board, where virtually no accountability exists and which can hardly be deemed an impartial participant

Open-ended issues like this one are what eventually cause CFPs to leave the fold; regardless of whether they have ever been sanctioned. Too much politics, bureaucracy, and the appearance of lack of "due-process !"

Although, personally, I've never had a bad experience with the Ethics Committee, it's clear that this is such a highly sensitive topic that one can never be too complacent or trusting that the process will be handled impartially and fair to all concerned.

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PAUL DOAK

Date: January 7, 2009

Section 2.2 (a) "evaluate the performance of volunteers during the hearings" What does this mean exactly? What are they looking for? These people are volunteering. Is there a defined list of issues or concerns that the volunteers must meet? If so where are they spelled out?

Under section 2.3 (A) in that it does not spell out criteria of the members for the commission nor does it define the process the CEO uses in filling the commission nor the term of each member- Are they staggered? Can one CEO have control over the whole board, dismiss them at will?

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RALPH J. FEITH, CFP®

Date: January 5, 2009

I come to you with 18 years of experience in securities arbitration experience. The basic concept of a hearing is twofold. One, to hear all of the facts as unbiased as possible before coming to a decision. Two, to NOT let previous cases impact your current decision. There are so many nuances that one common complaint of those that are not attorney’s is that assumptions are formed that may not apply to this particular case. I am referring to the change proposed in Aritcle 2.4 that will require that two members of the Panel be Commission members. I don’t know what the current case load is, but as more professionals become CFP certificants there will be more cases. When we are in times of financial stress, like we are currently in, there will be more cases. That means that the same commission members will hear more cases. If they have any biases, and all humans have some biases, then those biases will carry into each case. One of the biggest problems I found with FINRA (formally NASDR) hearings is that the same panel members were on many cases, and the same attorneys argued many cases. The attorneys came to know the panel members and just what pushed their buttons, and what they found offensive. The argued their cases to suit each panel member. There is a compilation of facts on each panel member that is kept by the trial attorneys who argue for the person bringing the compliant, in fact they have a large conference each year, of which I attended many years, and they hone their skills in playing to the panel. So do the Experts, of which I was one for so long. As you can see they were not interested in justice but in winning a case.

If you are in fact interested in justice then you must use many panel members and if possible they should ALL be CFP professionals with at least 5 years or more of experience. I haven’t a clue as to why you would have a non-CFP on the Panel. You are judging a person and impacting their career. As for attorney’s on the panel they are interested in law, not justice. It doesn’t take a genius to see how attorney’s have distorted our current laws so that justice cannot be found in our justice system. I have consulted in or participated in over 750 NASDR cases and they way in which they are conducted rarely provides justice for the public. They are a battle of attorney’s to see how much money they can make with no regard for the individual. A CFP is recognized as one having high standards and as such is much more likely to lose the case. In fact I have seen incredible actions by CFP’s that caused me to be ashamed that they were even admitted to the same organization as I take such pride in.

So, my opinion would be to keep a large pool of panel members and rotate them frequently. One member of the panel should be a Commission member, but no more than one, and he should not be an attorney.

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THE FINANCIAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION®

Date: January 30, 2009

The Financial Planning Association® (“FPA”®)1 appreciates the opportunity to submit comment on proposed revisions to Article 2 of CFP Board’s Disciplinary Rules and Procedures (“Rules”). FPA membership includes approximately 19,000 CFP® certificants. Accordingly we are interested in any substantive changes of procedures to, and oversight of, the professional disciplinary process.2 As part of the current review, we strongly commend CFP Board for reaching out to the certificant community by appointing a task force to seek input as well as going beyond its bylaws requirements in welcoming public comments on an exposure draft.

The proposal, as described in a CFP Board release, would clarify the governance structure and duties of the Disciplinary Ethics Commission (“DEC”) as approved by CFP Board of Directors in February 2008. In addition, the amendments would establish certain policies that were not previously addressed in the Rules.

FPA believes that, in general, rule changes that result in standardization and consistency in the disciplinary review process, as proposed here, makes sense. In this specific context, defining the boundaries of DEC authority and the role of the chief executive officer and staff counsel through consistent procedures benefit the public and provide assurance to certificants of a process that is fair to all parties.

In reviewing earlier public comments filed with CFP Board, the two principal areas of concern were: 1) in Article 2.1, removal of the DEC’s authority to investigate complaints; and 2) in Article 2.3, newly enumerated duties of the CEO that, among other things, establishes authority to appoint DEC members and volunteers, and to review and approve certain rules or other procedures recommended by DEC.

While we understand and appreciate the views of these commenters, we believe that CFP Board has undertaken significant, pragmatic steps in recent years to be inclusive and open to feedback from its stakeholders, including the certificant community. We believe that CFP Board, like FPA and others committed to promoting ethical standards for financial planners, share alignment in a common purpose. However real or not the problems identified by other commenters, we nonetheless encourage CFP Board to explain in practical terms how the changes that are adopted benefit the public while establishing equitable treatment of certificants in the disciplinary process.

Finally, we also encourage CFP Board to continue to provide a public comment period for any material changes to the Rules, and to periodically examine the effectiveness of rule changes as part of the annual report to be submitted to the Board and CEO under proposed amendment 2.2(b). Our specific comments follow.

Article 2.1 – Function and Jurisdiction of the Commission.

The primary change to the procedures in this section is eliminating the DEC’s “duty of investigating” alleged violations of the Rules of Conduct and non-compliance with the Practice Standards. Article 6 of the Rules, which is not being amended, provides for investigations to be carried out by CFP Board staff counsel. FPA supports this process as stated. However, we encourage CFP Board to incorporate a procedure in its exposure process, similar to the adopting release format used by the Securities and Exchange Commission, that respond to significant objections or questions raised by commenters with an explanation of why such changes were either adopted or rejected. We believe the questions raised by a number of commenters about the deletion of investigative duties could be adequately addressed in a similar format.

Article 2.2 – Powers and Duties of the Commission.

FPA supports clarification of the periodic reporting function of the Commission under 2.2(b) which would require such reports to be provided annually to the CEO and Board. We believe it is important to furnish this report to both CEO and the Board in order to address concerns expressed by certificants about transparency in the governance structure. Further, we would encourage CFP Board to consider making publicly available certain sections of the annual report, including statistics and other commentary, that provide stakeholders with a sense of how the overall process is working and shed light on trends in violations that would help the public and certificants identify problem areas.

Article 2.3 – Powers and Duties of the CEO of CFP Board.

FPA generally supports the clarifications of the role of the CEO in the governance structure with respect to disciplinary rules and procedure and appointment of volunteers. It is not clear, however, based on the authority of the CEO as “authorized and empowered” to perform certain duties, that such responsibilities are mandatory. As an example, under Article 2.3(e), the CEO is empowered to report to the Board of Directors on appointments and activities of the DEC, but it does not appear to require such reports to be made. We recommend that such performance of duties be made explicit.

In summary, FPA is pleased to provide these comments in support of the amendments.

I am happy to respond to any specific questions or comments that you may have.

Very truly yours,
Richard C. Salmen, CFP®, CFA, EA
President

1The Financial Planning Association® is the largest organization in the United States representing financial planners and affiliated firms, with approximately 28,500 individual members. FPA is incorporated in Washington, D.C., with administrative headquarters in Denver.

2Article IV of the FPA bylaws currently require all FPA members who hold themselves out to the public as financial planners to abide by CFP Board’s ethics requirements and Practice Standards as a condition of membership. See http://www.fpanet.org/docs/assets/BylawsapprovedJune2008.pdf.

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DAVID FRAGOMENI

Date: January 12, 2009

As someone who has shown interest serving on the Disciplinary panel, I feel these changes define job title responsibility and describes where oversight will come from. This should reduce confusion and provide guidance to all involved in the judicial process.

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DANIEL A. GIESEKE, CFP®, CRPC®

Date: January 5, 2009

I agree with the new language governing the ability to evaluate the performance of our volunteers. Also, Article 2.4 is much better stated in the new version, it is both more clear and concise. Well done.

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MIKE GUESS

Date: January 5, 2009

It seems to me that the equations produced by this revision are equivalent to the spreadsheet term "circular reference".

What happens when the CEO does not take a Commission Recommendation?

I am, unfortunately, not involved with the Board, but I have concern about whether the powers of the CEO are being diluted. Is that the intent?

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DEBBIE HEAP

Date: January 8, 2009

The changes make several references to the powers & duties of CEO.

Where do I see the section that explains how the CEO is chosen?

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PATRICE HORNER, CFP®

Date: February 1, 2009

I found the revised language much clearer on the oversight role of the Commission by the CFP CEO. It emphasizes its critical importance to the organization, yet retains the involvement and advisory capacity of the Commission itself.

In section 2.1, the duties to investigate is removed from the Commission activities. Also per 2.2(a) the Commission is no longer enlisting CFP certificants to assist in investigations or on the Panel. There is no longer language on who enlists the volunteers, as was previously worded.

In section 2.6, the new version is improved concerning the separation of duties of the Counsel vs the Advisory Counsel, improving impartiality and knowledge of the new rules.

In 2.7, the disciplinary review responsibilities are clearly to be conducted at the CFP offices, instead of an adhoc location as determined by the Counsel. However, the method of conducting the activities is unclear. Are they to be conducted by the Commission as previously detailed or the CFP Staff? This requires clarification.

The CFP designation benefits by a strong oversight arm. It distinguishes it from other similar certifications and should reassure the public as to the seriousness with which we take our fiduciary responsibilities.

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GUY KRAINES

Date: January 8, 2009

A couple of wording points:

2.2 The Commission shall be authorized and empowered to:

Using "shall be" suggests a future action, but doesn't say who would take such action. A better wording is "The Commission is hereby ..."

2.2 Evaluate the performance of the volunteers ...

The term "volunteers" is unclear in (a) - it doesn't show up in context until (c). A better approach is to combine (a) with (c):
"... The Commission Chair or Chair-Designee shall provide input to the CEO on the selection of prospective volunteers who serve temporarily on a Hearing Panel, and shall evaluate the performance of any such volunteers."

For your reference, I'm a CFP candidate who has passed the exam, has the relevant experience, education and degree, but has not yet filed the forms for certification.

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KARIN PETERSON LABARGE, CFP®

Date: January 6, 2009

After comparing the current and proposed changes to the disciplinary rules and procedures, I come away with the impression that the committee is losing both on the mandate side (no more investigation of alleged violations) and also on the duties side (not enlisting help from CFP certificants but evaluating the volunteers chosen by the CEO). Also, the Commision will now report through the CEO instead of directly to the CFP Board. In addition, the Commission will no longer adopt amendments but only propose changes to the CEO. This enlargement of CEO powers is a bit disturbing.

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LEON LABRECQUE

Date: January 2, 2009

Attached are my comments re the proposed changes:

2.1 We are removing the ‘investigation’ aspect of the Commission? Who conducts the investigation? Doesn’t the administrative body have an investigatory (or at least a fact-finding) function?

2.2 (c) Are we relegating the entire function to the CEO? Should it perhaps read “Recommend to the CEO and the Board of Directors...”

2.7 Is ‘central office’ redundant? Might it read “Unless otherwise approved by the Board of Directors, CFP Board’s headquarters shall serve as the venue for the:

  1. The request for an investigation of certificant or registrant conduct;
  2. The coordination of such investigations;
  3. The administration of all disciplinary enforcement proceedings carried out pursuant to these Procedures;
  4. The prosecution of charges of wrongdoing against certificants or registrants pursuant to these Procedures; and
  5. The performance of other such activities as are designated by the CEO”

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GEORGE E. MATTINGLY, CFP®

Date: January 3, 2009

After comparing the current and proposed changes to the disciplinary rules and procedures, I come away with the impression that the committee is losing both on the mandate side (no more investigation of alleged violations) and also on the duties side (not enlisting help from CFP certificants but evaluating the volunteers chosen by the CEO). Also, the Commision will now report through the CEO instead of directly to the CFP Board. In addition, the Commission will no longer adopt amendments but only propose changes to the CEO. This enlargement of CEO powers is a bit disturbing.

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DAN MOISAND, CFP®

Date: January 27, 2009

I am very happy to see the CFP Board solicit opinion on the proposed changes to the DRP's. I strongly encourage the Board to convert this step into a trend toward more transparency and openess.

The proposals are an improvement over the current DRP's making the lines of authority and duties of various parties clearer. Section 2.4 is also improved over the prior section describing composition of a hearing panel.

My biggest concern with the proposal is that too much power is vested in the position of CEO. Under this proposal, if the CEO and the DEC disagree on something, the DEC has to somehow get in front of the Board of Directors to make its case. The DEC can not even choose its own Chairperson without CEO approval. In at least the cases of selecting the DEC Chair (proposed 2.2 d) and establishing procedures for the conduct of the hearings (proposed 2.2 g), I believe the default should be the opposite. If the CEO has a problem with the Chair selected or a procedure developed by the DEC, he should try to resolve it with the DEC and if still concerned should make his case to the Board of Directors.

Again, thank you very much for making these proposals available for comment.

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HAROLD NEVILLE

Date: January 3, 2009

CONCUR WITH PROPOSED REVISIONS.

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LARRY PETERSON

Date: January 3, 2009

“Power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely” - Acton

I do not agree with the vesture of so much independent power in the CEO as to personally appoint the Commission Chair, members, and volunteers of the commission and approve or disapprove proposed rules. Especially when the CEO is empowered to “Oversee" the Commission and autonomously replace members.

While meaning no disrespect to the CEO, Commission Chair, Members, and Volunteers, this seems to be a perfect opportunity to create a puppet government.

As a minimum oversight, or veto power should be given to the Board of Directors regarding new rules.

Even though CEO autonomy will create efficiencies and reduce the board’s workload, the proposed revision creates too much opportunity for abuse and should not be implemented.

I fear these amendments would result a reduction of value in the CFP® Marks.

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WILLIAM L. RADDATZ, M.S., CFP®

Date: January 7, 2009

I had a chance to review the changes and while in some respects the changes are subtle, in other respects the changes cause some concern. The new rule states, “One member of each Hearing Panel shall serve as Chair of that hearing. The Hearing Panel Chair must be a Commission member.” It is not clear to me that a non-CFP® certificant can be a member of the DEC…if not, then he/she can’t be the Hearing Panel Chair. I believe that there are times when having a volunteer serve as the hearing panel chair is not just appropriate, it is wise. For example, the non-CFP® certificant may be a subject matter expert (i.e., a tax attorney, CPA, etc.). (If the non-CFP® certificant can be a commission member then my concern is irrelevant.) As we move forward in regulation/disciplinary procedures, having a reasonable number of public members in the process will add a great deal of credibility. Having said that, I am delighted that there must be at least two CFP® certificants on any hearing panel. This is almost mandatory if we are to have a process judged by one’s peers.

It appears that the Board is moving too far by vesting so much control in the CEO position for what I believe should be a much more independent body. I recognize that there may have been several years where the independence of the DEC was too great, but I fear the pendulum is swinging too far in the direction of the CEO. A balance needs to be struck.

I can live with the CEO being able to appoint the members to the DEC after first seeking input from the DEC members, although frankly I would prefer that the input of the DEC be sought and after such input make a recommendation to the CFP Board, who would then make the final decision about the member. This would provide for advice and consent which would serve as a check and balance.

Eventually, all of the members of the DEC would have been chosen by the CEO. In fact, a majority of the DEC has already been appointed by the current CEO. Thus, one can only hope that the CEO would be happy to have anyone on the DEC as the Chair. In addition to vesting the CEO with the right to appoint the members to the DEC, he also controls the leadership, i.e., the Chair. There is no reason the CEO should be upset should the DEC select its own Chair. Remember, the CEO selected all the members anyway. Why would the CEO object to the selection of a Chair made by the DEC as opposed to being appointed by the CEO?

The way it is currently proposed provides for no checks and balances in my opinion, and further there is the potential for political influence that might raise some questions concerning the independence of the DEC. The proposed rule should equate “substance” with “appearance”. Our branches of government contain a separation of powers even though they are interrelated, i.e., the President nominates a Supreme Court Justice along with the advice and consent of the Senate. This is not to say that the DEC should be able to “run amok” in selecting its Chair. Even with the CEO appointing the members, there is a possibility for a “rogue” DEC. It might occur under unusual circumstances, but that possibility exists. Therefore, I believe it would be better to have the process work in the following manner. Current DEC members could make recommendations to the CEO for appointment to the nine member Commission. The CEO could then recommend these suggested Commission members to the Board, which could then be approved by CFP Board. The Commission could then select its own Chair each year, but the CEO could reserve the right to challenge the election by making a presentation to CFP Board. In my opinion, this would be a much more fair, independent, and logical process than the one laid out in the DRPs.

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KEITH J. SORESSI

Date: February 1, 2009

I write in favor of the proposed revisions to Article 2 of CFP Board's Disciplinary Rules & Procedures. I commend the CFP Board on this endeavor.

By way of background, I am currently the Associate Executive Director of the New York State Bar Association. The New York State Bar has recently recommended revisions to New York's Rules of Professional Conduct, which the Court of Appeals approved. Prior to my current position, I served briefly as the Director of Professional Review and Director of Education and Examination for the CFP Board and am familiar with the proposed revisions. In addition, I served as Regulation Counsel for the District of Columbia Bar and assisted in the comprehensive rewriting of its Disciplinary Rules of Procedures, which were also adopted by the D.C. Court of Appeals.

Throughout my involvement in revising pertinent rules and procedures, one of the main goals was to draft rules that were not only clear but created a system that was efficient, effective, and above all, transparent. To effectuate a transparent system, it is important to institute checks and balances on each layer of the system.

I believe that CFP Board's revised rules accomplish this task, particularly in revising and refining the oversight roles of the Board/CEO and Commission as well as insuring that no person shall serve as both CFP Board Counsel and CFP Board Advisory Counsel during the same set of hearings.

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R. GORDEN THRELFALL, MBA, CFP®

Date: January 2, 2009

It appears that the proposed revisions tend to add to the authority of the CEO and diminish the authority of the CFP Board's Board of Directors. In the absence of information tending to show that the Board of Directors is incapable of maintaining its authority, I see no reason for these changes.

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ALAN B. UNGAR, CFP®

Date: January 5, 2009

I am having a hard time understanding why something that has worked so well in the past is being fixed. The old saying "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" resonates with me in this case. I think it is a mistake to have the CEO be the person who makes the decision re. who is on the commission and is the chair. I believe these changes make the organization vulnerable because it puts too much power in one person's hands. The commission is perfectly capable of picking its own chair.

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ANNA MARIA WAECHTER

Date: January 5, 2009

I have reviewed the changes and find the changes dilute conflicts of interest.

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DEXTER WARD, CPA/PFS, CFP®

Date: January 26, 2009

Having reviewed these proposed revisions, I am very concerned about the concentration of power to be given the CEO position with these changes. The CEO would have the ability to control the entire disciplinary process with very little oversight from the board.

By being able to select members of the Commission without board consent & have the Commission report directly to him/her, the CEO would be able to virtually interpret the Code of Ethics without the advise and consent of the Board. THIS IS NOT GOOD.

The commission should only report to the Board. The CEO could suggest and recommend, of course, but the final selection of members should be the responsibility of the Board and should not be delegated.

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STEVEN F. WERTIME

Date: January 5, 2009

Article 2.1 of the proposed change drops the duty of "investigating" in the current language. Article of 2.7 includes "investigation" of certificant conduct. I am unclear whether the Commission is charged with doing any investigating of alleged misconduct. Who or what does the investigating, and how does this function relate to the work of the Commission? Is someone else doing the investigating prior to the work of the Commission?

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JIM WILLIAMS, CFP®

Date: January 26, 2009

I think I’ve made my position pretty clear. For the record:

  • I believe that the delegation of such broad authority to the CEO, even though ostensibly constrained in these procedures, is unwarranted, unwise, and likely to be harmful to the mark and to the profession as a whole.
  • I believe that having a staff attorney in the ratification process taints the independence and objectivity of the deliberations. The prohibition from acting as both Board Counsel and Board Advisory Counsel is meaningless and lacks any substantive constraint on CFP Board legal staff influencing the deliberations.

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GRACE M. WORLEY, CFP®

Date: January 5, 2009

I want to go on record still objecting to the proposed revisions to articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 that essentially places substantial powers with the CEO regarding the procedures, operations, appointments and leadership of the DEC. Strategically this is a troublesome shift of authority from the Commission which judges the actions and affects the viability of a planner’s livelihood as it relates to use of the marks. A single CEO who is not knowledgeable about our profession, has suspect agendas or is not personally vested in the viability of the marks (CEOs do move on, but certificants/planners continue to practice) could structure appointments and processes to compromise the value of the oversight process. A weak or disparate Board of Directors is not much of counterbalance.

This conflict of oversight objectives versus real world results has been problematic in similarly structured government regulatory agencies.

Participants who actually have to live with the consequences of the Commission’s actions and effectiveness (planners) are more appropriate as key decisionmakers in the DEC’s operations and appointments.

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